By Robin G. Jordan
In this second article in my series on the ACNA provisional constitution and canons I examine the Provincial Assembly and the Provincial Council and their roles in the ecclesiastical government of the Anglican Church in North America. I also look at a number of the weaknesses of the particular form of ecclesiastical government that the provisional constitution and canons establishes.
The ACNA provincial constitution provides for a Provincial Assembly composed of representatives of the constituent bodies of the ACNA “in balance and in number from the laity, bishops and other clergy as from time-to-time determined by canon.” This Provincial Assembly is largely a titular body. Article VI, Section 1 states that “the chief work of the Provincial Assembly shall be strengthening the mission of the Province.” This is the envisioned role for the Provincial Assembly. How the Provincial Assembly is expected to fulfill this role is discussed below.
Article VI, Section 2 of the provisional constitution states that “the Provincial Assembly shall ratify Constitutional amendments and Canons adopted by the Provincial Council” Article VI, Section 3 states “the Provincial Assembly shall elect the Provincial Council.” These are the extent of the Provincial Assembly’s powers. The Provisional Assembly has no power to elect its own officers, appoint its own committees, or establish its own standing rules. It has no power to conduct hearings and inquiries or summon witnesses. It has no power to censure or suspend or remove from office. It has no power to initiate, adopt, amend, or repeal legislation.
Canon 2 of the ACNA provisional canons state:
“Every diocese, cluster or network has representation at the Provincial Assembly at the basic level of its bishop(s), two clergy and two laypersons. For dioceses, clusters or networks with an ASA in multiples of 1,000, there will be an additional cleric and lay person for each additional 1000 ASA.”
Canon 3 states:
“The diocese, cluster or network "in formation" shall be represented in the Provincial Assembly by the Vicar General and one clergy and one layperson.”
The provisional constitution also provides for a Provincial Council “composed of an equal number of bishops, clergy and lay persons, chosen by the Provincial Assembly from among its members.” Article II, Section 2 of the provisional constitution states that “new dioceses, clusters or networks (whether regional or affinity-based) may be added to the Province by invitation of the Provincial Council….” Article V gives the Provincial Council power to make canons. Article VII, Section 1 states that “the Provincial Council is the governing body for the Anglican Church in North America and shall have the authority to establish the program and budget of the Province.” Article VII, Section 5 gives the Provincial Council power to co-opt six additional persons to be members of the Provincial Council. It does not specify whether these persons should be clergy or laypersons or both. Article VII, Section 6 gives the Provincial Council power to appoint officers; Article VII, Section gives the Provincial Council the power to appoint an Executive Committee. Article XI vests the appointment of the members of the Provincial Tribunal in the Provincial Council. Article XIV gives the Provincial Council the power to expel a constituent body of the ACNA or a group of constituent ACNA bodies.
Canon 3 delineates a procedure by which the Provincial Council may confer temporary “in formation” status to dioceses, clusters, and networks “in formation.” Canon 8 gives responsibility for developing the program and budget of the ACNA to the Executive Committee of the Provincial Council. Canon 9 gives the Executive Committee “authority to carry out the work of the Province between meetings of the Provincial Council.”
Like the ecclesiastical organs of the Anglican Church of Canada and The Episcopal Church, the clergy dominate the ecclesiastical organs of the ACNA. By “clergy” I mean both episcopal and non-episcopal clergy. While bishops may differ in rank and office from presbyters and deacons, they are nonetheless clergy. (Catholics would say that they differ in order but I am writing from an Evangelical viewpoint.) The lay members of the ACNA are not represented on these bodies in proportion to their actual numbers. If we examine the constitutions of a number of Anglican Provinces, we discover some attempt to give lay members representation at least in the General Synod in greater proportion to their actual numbers. In the General Synod of the Church of Nigeria the ratio of non-episcopal clergy representatives to lay representatives from a diocese is two clergy representatives to every three lay representatives. This is also the case in the diocesan representation in the General Synod of the Anglican Church in Aotearoa, New Zealand, and Polynesia. Provisions for co-opted and ex-officio members of the General Synod may to a certain degree offset these ratios so that the proportion of non-episcopal clergy in these two bodies may be greater than the ratio of two clergy representatives to every three lay representatives. The presence of episcopal clergy, or bishops, in the two bodies gives the clergy fairly substantial representation in the two bodies. In the Governing Body of the Church in Wales and the General Synod of the Church of Ireland ratio of non-episcopal clergy representatives to lay representatives from a diocese is roughly one clergy representative to every two lay representatives. Here again provisions for co-opted and ex officio members and the presence of episcopal clergy give the clergy fairly substantial representation.
The General Synod of the Church of England is composed of three houses—the Upper and Lower Houses of the Convocation of Canterbury and York and a House of Laity. The Upper House of Convocation consists of the archbishops and bishops of the two provinces. The Lower House of the Convocation consists of three persons elected by and from the deans of the Province of Canterbury; either the Dean of Jersey or the Dean of Guernsey; the proctors of the clergy of the Province of Canterbury; a minimum of three and a maximum of four persons in holy orders elected or chosen from the armed forces chaplains of the Province of Canterbury; the Chaplain General of the Prisons or a prison chaplain nominated by the Archbishop of Canterbury; a maximum of two persons chosen by the priests and deacons who are members of religious communities with their mother house in the Province of Canterbury; and the Dean of the Arches and Auditor, the Vicar-General of the Province of Canterbury, the Third Church Estates Commissioner, the Chairman of the Church of England Pensions Board and any member of the Archbishops’ Council beneficed, licensed or resident in the Province of Canterbury, if such persons are priests or deacons; two persons elected by and from the deans of the Province of York; the proctors of the clergy of the Province of York; a maximum of two persons chosen by the priests and deacons who are members of religious communities with their mother house in the Province of York; and the Vicar-General of the Province of York and any member of the Archbishops’ Council beneficed, licensed or resident in the Province of York, if such persons are deacons or priests. The canons of the Church of England limit the maximum number of “proctors directly elected and specially elected” to the Lower House of Convocation from the dioceses in the Province of Canterbury to 136 and from the dioceses in the Province of York to 59. Each diocese has a minimum of three proctors with the exception of the Diocese in Europe and the Diocese of Sodor and Man. The diocese in Europe has two proctors and the Diocese of Sodor and Man one proctor. The canons of the Church of England also give the Lower House of the Convocation power to co-opt a maximum of three persons in holy orders in the case of Canterbury and two persons in holy orders in the case of York to be members of that House.
Schedule 3, Part IV of the Synodical Government Measure of 1969 establishes the House of Laity of the General Synod. The House of Laity consists of the members elected by the diocesan electors of each diocese of the Provinces of Canterbury and York; three members, two from the Province of Canterbury and one from the Province of York, chosen by “chosen by the lay members of religious communities from among their number;” and an a number of ex-officio and co-opted members. Except in the case of the diocese in Europe, the diocesan electors are the members of the houses of laity of all the deanery synods in the diocese other than persons co-opted to the deanery synod and persons who are lay members of a religious community with separate representation in the General Synod. The diocesan electors of the diocese in Europe are elected by the annual meetings of the chaplaincies in that diocese, the number of diocesan electors being determined by the bishop’s council and standing committee of the diocese.
Schedule 3, Section IV, states:
“[F136] [F2 (1) The total number of members directly elected and specially elected from the dioceses in the Province shall not exceed one hundred and seventy for Canterbury and eighty for York and no diocese shall have fewer than three directly elected members (except the diocese in Europe which shall elect two members, and the diocese of Sodor and Man which shall elect one member). Ex officio and co-opted members (as defined in rule [F342]) shall be additional to the said total number. In this rule the term “specially elected” means the representatives of the religious communities referred to in rule [F335(1)] and the representatives of the Channel Islands elected in accordance with the Channel Islands (Representation) Measure 1931 and such persons shall be included in the said total number.”
It goes on to states:
“[F4(2)] The total number of members to be elected by the diocesan electors of all the dioceses shall be fixed by resolution of the General Synod not later than the last day of November in the fourth year after the last preceding election of the house of Laity (but subject as hereinafter provided), and the resolution shall apportion the number so fixed to the Provinces of Canterbury and York in a proportion of sixty eight to thirty two or as nearly as possible thereto and shall divide the number among the dioceses so that the number of members to be elected by the several dioceses are as nearly as possible proportionate to the total number of names certified for them under the following paragraph.]
“[F4(3)] The secretary of each diocesan synod shall, not later than the first day of August in the fourth year after the last preceding election of the House of Laity, certify to the secretary of the General Synod the total number of names on the rolls of the parishes of the diocese . . . F5”
Schedule 3, Section IV further states:
“[F142] (1) The following persons, if they are not in Holy Orders, shall be ex-officio members of the House of Laity;—
“(a) the Dean of the Arches and Auditor;
“[F2(b) the Vicar-General of the Province of Canterbury;]
“[F3(c)] the Vicar-General of the Province of York;
“[F3(d)] the three Church Estate Commissioners;
“[F3(e)] the Chairman of the Central Board of Finance.
“[F4(f) the Chairman of the Church of England Pensions Board.]
“[F5(g) the members of the Archbishops’ Council who are actual communicants]
“(2) The House of Laity shall have power to co-opt persons who are F6. . . [F7actual lay communicants]of [F8eighteen years or upwards] to be members of the House of Laity:
“Provided that:—
“(a) the co-opted members shall not at any time exceed five in number; and,
“(b) no person shall be qualified to become a co-opted member unless not less than two-thirds of the members of the Standing Committee of the House of Laity shall have first consented to his being co-opted, either at a meeting of the Standing Committee or in writing.
“(3) Except in regard to their appointment, the ex-officio and co-opted members shall have the same rights and be subject to the same rules and regulations as elected members….”
It is noteworthy that the House of Laity has initiated a number of important resolutions, including the resolution that led to the General Synod of the Church of England debating whether the church should be evangelizing adherents of other faiths. The bishops of the Church of England with some notable exceptions were opposed to such a debate. They favored maintaining “community cohesion” over the evangelizing the growing Hindu, Muslim, and pagan populations of the British Isles. The debate led in turn to the General Synod affirming the Biblical doctrine of salvation in Christ alone.
One might have expected that in light of the role of bishops and other clergy in the drift of the Anglican Church of Canada and The Episcopal Church away from orthodox Christianity and Biblical Anglicanism and the greater conservatism and numbers of the laity, the lay members of the ACNA would have greater representation in the Provincial Assembly and the Provincial Council of the ACNA. In the Anglican Church of Canada and The Episcopal Church, in which the clergy dominate the system of ecclesiastical government of the province, the clergy has historically demonstrated a high susceptibility to innovations in doctrine and practice. As the clergy of the province has increasingly grown liberal and revisionist, the province has increasingly moved in a liberal and revisionist direction. On other hand, the laity has shown a more conservative disposition. The laity also comprises the largest segment of the ACNA membership. They are major stakeholders in the ACNA without which the ACNA is likely to become another Continuing Anglican jurisdiction. They carry the main burden of the evangelistic outreach of the local church. They pay the salaries of the clergy. They fund, lead, and staff the ministries and programs of the local church. They make the mortgage payments on the newly constructed church buildings or the rent payments on the temporary facilities used by the local church. They support with their financial giving the ecclesiastical structures of the ACNA. One would expect that the laity would have been given greater representation in the Provincial Assembly and the Provincial Council on this basis alone.
However, the drafters of the ACNA provisional constitution and canons appear to have followed at least in this case the models to which they were accustomed, that of the Anglican Church of Canada and The Episcopal Church. Consequently, a number of attendant problems can be expected to carryover to the Anglican Church in North America from these ecclesiastical bodies. The adoption of these models also eliminate a potential check of the check and balance variety since in a system in which the clergy have fairly substantial representation; the lay representatives are more vulnerable to clergy efforts to manipulate them and to control their vote. They are more likely to vote with the clergy representatives. They are not likely to exercise any independence and to vote their conscience. This explains how lay delegates who hold a conservative position on a number of key issues can attend a session of the General Convention of The Episcopal Church and vote in support of the liberal position on these issues.
Like the Anglican Church of Canada and The Episcopal Church the ratio of non-episcopal clergy representatives to lay representatives for each “diocese” is one clergy representative for every lay representative. Under the constitutions of the Anglican Church of Canada and The Episcopal Church each diocese is entitled to a minimum of four non-episcopal clergy delegates and four lay delegates to the General Synod or General Convention, as the case may be. An ACNA “diocese” is entitled to a minimum of two non-episcopal clergy delegates and two lay delegates to the Provincial Assembly. An ACNA “diocese” in formation is entitled to only one non-episcopal clergy delegate and one lay delegate. For an ecclesiastical organization that has boasted in recent months that it is larger than a number of Anglican provinces, the ACNA has a relatively small Provincial Assembly.
Along with the clergy dominance and size of the Provincial Assembly, what is also notable about the Provincial Assembly is that it has very limited powers. Its function has been described as being more like the AMiA Winter Conference than the General Convention of The Episcopal Church. For those unfamiliar with the AMiA Winter Conference, it bears a strong resemblance to a three-day long pep rally. There is Bible study sessions, prayer meetings, inspirational talks, workshops, booths, and addresses by visiting dignitaries from the global South Anglican provinces. Members of the AMiA from one part of North America have an opportunity to meet members of the AMiA from other parts of North America. The AMiA Conference is also used to announce new AMiA initiatives. It is not a governing body like a General Synod or a General Convention.
The ANCA provisional constitution assigns to the even smaller Provincial Council the powers normally assigned to the General Synod or the equivalent of an Anglican province in a synodical form of ecclesiastical government. Under the terms of the ACNA provisional constitution the Provincial Assembly does not exercise any kind of oversight over the Provincial Council. The Provincial Council, while it is elected by the Provincial Assembly and must submit canons and constitutional amendments to the Provincial Assembly for ratification, is not accountable to the Provincial Assembly. The Provincial Council is not even required to consult the Provincial Assembly on major budgetary and program decisions. In a synodical form of ecclesiastical government the Provincial Council or its equivalent would be the executive organ of the General Synod or its equivalent and would be accountable and subject to the General Synod. The General Synod would appoint and remove its members, determine its powers and functions, and exercise oversight over the Provincial Council.
As I have written elsewhere the Provincial Council bears a striking resemblance to the board of directors of a corporation, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union, the People’s Council of Ministers of the People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, and similar bodies. In all these instances the smaller body and not the larger body electing it is the real center of power in the organization—whether corporation, party, or nation.
The ACNA clergy dominates the Provincial Council as they do the Provincial Assembly. With the concentration of so much power in the Provincial Council, one can expect to see that body the focus of intense political maneuvering. Different factions can be expected to emerge in the ACNA and form alliances to control that body. The Provincial Council is vulnerable to takeover by the strongest faction in the ACNA and its allies with the coalition that they form determining the direction of the ACNA.
The concentration of power in one small body nullifies whatever safeguards the ACNA provisional constitution establishes for the protection of theological affinity groups. These safeguard are at best minimal—one provision for the organization of “dioceses” on the basis of theological affinity, a provision that is greatly weakened by the canonical requirement that such a “diocese” must within the space of five years grow to at least 12 churches with an ASA of at least fifty each and a collective ASA of 1000 in order to become a recognized diocese of the ACNA. This provision is further weakened by the terms of the ACNA provisional constitution that vest the governance of the ACNA in the Provincial Council in which the “diocese” in formation is not guaranteed even minimal representation.
The ACNA provisional constitution does not offer to its “dioceses” any safeguards like those that the constitution of the Anglican Church of Australia offers to its dioceses. Under the terms of the constitution of the Anglican Church of Australia any proposed canon that deals with or concerns the faith, ritual, ceremonial, or discipline of the church is treated as a special bill in the General Synod. In order to pass the General Synod a special bill must be approved by at least two-thirds of the members of each of the three houses present. If a special bill passes the General Synod, it becomes a provisional canon. The provisional canon is then referred to the diocesan synod of each diocese for its consideration. Each diocesan synod, within a period of time specified by canon or by the provisional canon, submits to the President of the General Synod “its assent to or dissent from the provisional canon together with such report and recommendation as it may think fit.” If every diocesan synod assents to the provisional canon, it is, upon the declaration of the President that every diocesan synod had assented to it, a canon duly passed. However, if every diocesan synod does not assent to the provisional canon, the reports and recommendations received from the diocesan synods are presented to the General Synod and the provisional canon is presented to the General Synod as if it were a bill. If the bill is approved by at least two-thirds of the members of each of the three houses present, it is a canon duly passed. However, if the General Synod, immediately before the vote is taken, by a majority of the three houses voting together, so resolves, it is a provisional bill only, whereupon the foregoing procedure is again followed.
Any canon affecting the faith, ritual, ceremonial, or discipline of the church is deemed to affect the order and good government of the church within a diocese, and does not come into force in any diocese unless and until the diocese by ordinance adopts the canon. If the General Synod declares that the provisions of any other canon affect the order and good government of the church within a diocese, it does not come into force in any diocese unless and until the diocese by ordinance adopts it. If the General Synod does not so declare, the diocesan synod of a diocese may declare its opinion that the provisions of the canon affect the order and good government of the church within such diocese and notify the President within one month after so declaring its opinion. If that diocesan synod so declare its opinion within a period of two years from the date of the passing of the canon and the Standing Committee of the General Synod advises the President that it agrees with the diocesan synod’s opinion the canon does not and is deemed not to have come into force in that convocation unless and until it is adopted by ordinance of the diocesan synod. If the diocesan synod declare its opinion at any time after the expiration of the period of two years and the Standing Committee of the General Synod advises the President that it agrees with the diocesan synod’s opinion the canon ceases to apply to the diocese as from the date of the Standing Committee’s declaration and does not after that date again come into force in such diocese unless and until it is adopted by ordinance of the diocesan synod. If the Standing Committee of the General Synod in either case does not so advise the President he refers the question raised by the diocesan synod’s opinion to the Appellate Tribunal for its determination and unless the Appellate Tribunal determines the question in the negative the canon is deemed not to have come into force in that diocese in the first case or to have force or effect in that diocese after the date of the diocesan synod’s declaration in the second case until the diocesan synod by ordinance adopts the canon. Any canon adopted as just described by a diocesan synod may by ordinance be excluded at a subsequent date.
These provisions of the Anglican Church of Australia’s constitution preserve the autonomy of the diocese in the ACA. They provide safeguards against enactments of the General Synod that would impose unacceptable changes in faith, ritual, ceremonial or discipline upon a diocese. The domination of the General Synod by one faction and its allies is much more difficult under these provisions. They also discourage hastily conceived legislation. They encourage those seeking to propose legislation in the General Synod to consult with all the diocesan synods beforehand and to work out with the these bodies legislative proposals that are agreeable to them. The provisions of the ACA constitution also limit what financial liabilities the General Synod can impose on any diocese by canon or rule.
The lack of similar safeguards in the ACNA provisional constitution is surprising after what has happened in the Anglican Church of Canada and The Episcopal Church during the past two decades. So is the absence of substantial guarantees of diocesan autonomy in view of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s statements about the relationship of the diocese, the See of Canterbury, and the Anglican Communion and the general agreement of conservative Anglicans and Episcopalians with this position, as well as the events of the last two decades. This leads individuals like myself to ask has all through which we have gone been for nothing. The ACNA provisional constitution is extremely disappointing. The provisional canons are not any less disappointing.
In my next article in this series on the ACNA provisional constitution and canons I examine the procedure for the election and appointment of bishops and the new office of Archbishop and Primate of the Anglican Church in North America in the ACNA provisional constitution and canons.
I have submitted to the ACNA leadership a proposal for an alternative constitution for the ACNA modeled on that of the Anglican Church of Australia and the Anglican Church of the Province of the Southern Cone of the Americas; it is on the Internet with an introduction explaining its features and a commentary on two sections needing further revision at: http://anglicansablaze.blogspot.com/2009/01/proposed-constitution-of-anglican.html
4 comments:
Your commentary is very interesting. Thank you for this post.
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The recent history of the ACoC does not support the idea that bishop-and-clergy dominance over laypeople is responsible for the ascendency of liberalism. The orthodox candidate for primate was preferred by bishops and clergy but opposed by laypeople, who would not move to her even though her leads in the other houses made her victory look inevitable. Same-sex blessings were approved by the laypeople and lost because of their defeat in the house of bishops.
I do think that laypeople are more conservative than clergy in the sense of being resistant to change, of being inert. This kind of conservatism naturally does not get much represented in elections to synod delegateships.
On the other hand it does explain in part the ascendancy of liberalism in The Episcopal Church. Clergy, episcopal and non-epsicopal, dominate the General Convention. They generally influence the election of delegates to the Diocesan Convention and influence what resolutions are passed in the Diocesan Convention and what resolutions never make it to the floor. They also influence what delegates are elected to the General Convention. Those who took the lead in introducing the ordination of gays and lesbians and the authorization of same sex in The Episcopal Church were bishops and other clergy.
Is the General Synod organized on a proportional basis with the number of lay delegates exceeding the number of clergy delegates? From what I understood each each diocesan delegation has an equal number of clergy and lay delegates, as in the General Convention of The Episcopal Church. My understanding of the primatial electoral procedure in The Anglican Church of Canada is that the Order of Bishops vote to nominate candidates for Primate and the Orders of Clergy and Laity vote to elect the Primate. Only if the Orders of Clergy and Laity reach an impasse and the number of candidates for Primate are reduced to two does the Order of Bishops vote to elect the Primate.
I would have thought whoever nominated a woman candidate would have gauged the extent to which the other two Orders would support her candidacy. It is very plausible that some bishops may have supported her nomination knowing that the conservativism of those opposed to a woman Primate would work against her.Perhaps those who nominated her thought that she would won liberal support because she was a woman and underestimated the opposition to a woman candidate. Rather blaming the laity who did not rally to her support, I would look at the part those who nominated her and who supported that nomination played. They picked the wrong candidate.
Conservativism is by its very nature resistant to change, tending or disposed to maintain existing views, conditions, or institutions. The characterization of conservatism in the laity as "being inert" suggest a prejudice. From what I have observed, a lot of passivity in the laity has been encouraged by the dominance of the clergy in the church. This is certainly the case in The Episcopal Church and I would suspect that it is also the case in The Anglican Church of Canada.
The candidate that bishop and clergy "preferred" but the lay people "opposed" was Victoria Matthews. Ostensibly theologically conservative and an Anglo-Catholic, she voted that gay partnerships did not conflict with the core doctrines of the Anglican Church of Canada. She is quoted in an Anglican Journal article following her nomination as saying,"I embrace the theology that the Holy Spirit works through the church...."
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