Authority, Mission, and the Anglican Church in North America - Part III: Authoritarian Forms of Governance in Para-Church Organizations

By Robin G. Jordan

In this third article in the series, “Authority, Mission, and the Anglican Church in North America,” I examine several mistaken beliefs about denominations and other para-church organizations with authoritarian organizational structures as well as look at a number of major weaknesses of this type of denominational organization. I also take a look at the Anglican Mission, the largest para-church organizations forming the Anglican Church in North America, and the drawbacks of its particular structure and form of governance.

One fallacy is that authoritarian para-church organizations are more missional. The organization of a denomination along authoritarian lines does not guarantee a mission mindset. The Church of England was at one time more authoritarian in its organizational structures but it did not have a strong mission orientation. The missionaries of privately organized Church Missionary Society and the chaplains of the East India Company and the Hudson Bay Company were largely responsible for the spread of Anglican Christianity outside of the British Isles. The Roman Catholic Church in North America is not particularly noted for its missionary zeal in the twenty-first century. The Eastern Orthodox Churches are authoritarian in their organizational structures but they have generally confined themselves to the various ethnic and national groups that embraced Eastern Orthodoxy in the past. They may start new Eastern Orthodox churches to serve outside their country of origin the ethnic or national groups they traditional have served. But they do not engage in missionary work outside these groups. Their approach is not to seek those who may be interested in Eastern Orthodoxy but to let those who are interested in Eastern Orthodoxy seek them. A number of Continuing Anglican jurisdictions are authoritarian in their organizational structures but they have been slow to grow if they have grown at all. Missionary work has not been one of their strengths.

Two of the groups of Christians who played a leading role in the evangelization of the American frontier—the Baptists and the Congregationalists—had no denominational organization to speak of during the early stages of the westward expansion. What denominational organization that they did develop was not particularly authoritarian in organizational structure. Most Baptist church plants were largely the work of indigenous church starters, farmer-preachers, and took advantage of natural social networks in frontier communities. The Congregationalists did send some missionaries west to the frontier. These missionaries were sponsored by individual churches or by loose associations of churches organized for missionary purposes. The Congregationalists also exploited natural social networks that they found. In its church planting efforts in the twenty-first century the churches of the Southern Baptist Convention relies heavily on indigenous church starters and bi-vocational church planters as well as full-time church planters sponsored by individual churches, local associations, and state conventions. The exploitation of natural social networks is very much a part of its denominational church planting strategy. In a century and a culture that values horizontal networking over vertical hierarchies, the organization of a denomination or other para-church organization that takes advantage of this development may be the more culturally-appropriate way of reaching and evangelizing the lost in twenty-first century North America and enfolding them into new churches.



The adoption of the authoritarian organizational structures of the African provinces does not eliminate bureaucracy as is sometimes claimed. This can be seen from the ecclesiastical organization of the Anglican Mission, which has been strongly influenced by the authoritarian organization structures of the African provinces and the Roman Catholic Church. It also shows the strong influence of corporate America. While it is an overseas missionary jurisdiction of the Anglican Church of Rwanda and a sub-provincial jurisdiction of the Anglican Church in North America, the Anglican Mission as a para-church organization also has characteristics of a denomination.

At the top of the Anglican Mission’s bureaucracy is Bishop Chuck Murphy, chairman of the board and primatial vicar. Under him are the division managers, the missionary bishops, and under them are the middle managers, the network leaders. Under them are the supervisors, the clergy. This organization is similar to that seen in federal and state government as well as corporations.

The ecclesiastical organization of the Anglican Mission, however, differs from the organization of corporations and federal and state government in that external oversight and accountability are negligible. In corporations the man at the top is usually accountable to a board of directors that in turn is accountable to the investors. There may be state and federal agencies that regulate the business of the corporation, and one or more unions may have negotiated a contract with the corporation and have shop stewards in offices and departments of the corporation. The Enron scandal of a few years ago, however, revealed that in US corporate organizations the oversight that corporate stockholders were able to exercise over corporate management is minimal at best. There is very little accountability. Consequently, Enron executives were able to siphon off millions of dollars in corporate assets and profits.

In federal and state agencies the director of the agency is accountable to the governor or through a cabinet secretary to the president who in turn is accountable to the electorate. There will be federal and state civil service regulations. One or more unions may represent the employees of the agency. A federal board or commission may oversee a federal agency. A state agency may have a state board or commission that has oversight of the agency. There may be one or more oversight committee in the US Congress or state legislature and there is the US Congress or state legislature itself. If the state agency is administering federally funded programs, there may be one or more federal agencies overseeing the expenditure of these funds. Federal and state agencies have their own quality control department and federal and state governments have inspector general’s offices. There are various public watchdog groups and organizations.

In the Anglican Mission the primatial vicar and the missionary bishops are subject the oversight of the primate of a distant African province to whom they are as members of its provincial house of bishops accountable. If problems arise between Anglican Mission clergy and laity and their bishops, their only recourse is to appeal to the Primate of Rwanda. The situation of the clergy and laity of the Anglican Mission is reminiscent of the American colonists in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. The governor of the colony was appointed by the King or a company holding a royal charter. Both were on the other side of the Atlantic. If they had a dispute with the governor, their only recourse was to petition the King or the company. Their likelihood of a sympathetic hearing from the King or the company that had appointed the governor was not good.

In an ecclesiastical organization that has negligible external oversight and accountability, the likelihood of abuse of power, arbitrariness in governance, malfeasance in office, and other problems are high. Such an organization can draw out the worst instincts in those in the positions of authority. Human beings are prone to sinfulness. Even those whom the Holy Spirit has made regenerate are not free from this proclivity. The nature of sin is that the sinner may justify his conduct as suiting circumstances or otherwise rationalize his actions to himself.

The prospect of loosing clergy and laity or even the actual loss of clergy and laity, as is sometimes claimed, is no deterrent to the abuse of power or arbitrariness in governance. The last thirty years has shown that they were ineffectual in deterring Continuing Anglican jurisdiction leaders from abusing their power or acting despotically. The last decade has shown that they have failed to make Episcopal leaders abstain from doing the same things.

The bureaucratic structure of the Anglican Mission may be more streamlined than it is in many corporations and state and federal agencies. Its bureaucracy may operate more effectively and efficiently than that of older denominations with a centralized hierarchy. However, in any organization effectiveness and efficiency will reach an optimal level and then taper off. An organization that is effectively and efficiently performing its functions today may not be as effective and efficient in five or ten years. Once authoritarian organizational structures are made an integral part of a denomination, those structures are going to resist any change to the organization of the denomination. They may in time become obstacles to the denomination’s mission.

The recent scandals that have rocked the Roman Catholic Church in the United States and Ireland point to another major weakness of this type of ecclesiastical organization. Those in positions of authority not only have considerable discretionary powers but also they have no local oversight and accountability. Oversight and accountability is vertical. There is no horizontal or lateral oversight and accountability. In the case of the Roman Catholic bishops involved in these scandals they were ultimately subject to the oversight of the Holy Office and accountable to the Pope. However, there were several layers of hierarchy between them and the Vatican. Rather than deal openly and publicly with a chronic problem—sexual predators in the Roman Catholic priesthood who were abusing and exploiting children, they concealed and exacerbated the problem that did not come to light until a large number of children had fallen victim to the predations of these priests. They put what they saw as the interests of the institution before the safety and welfare of the children in its churches and schools.

Although Anglican Mission clergy and laity have a major stake in the Anglican Mission, they play no role in the oversight and accountability structures of the Anglican Mission except at the level of the local congregation. The Anglican Mission has a College of Presbyters but it serves only as a council of advice to the Primatial Vicar. Beyond the local congregation all oversight and accountability is vertical. There is no horizontal or lateral oversight and accountability.

Due to the Anglican Mission’s peculiar relationship with the Anglican Church in North America as an overseas missionary jurisdiction of the Anglican Church of Rwanda, which operates under the constitution and canons of its parent province, whose bishops and other clergy are clergy of the province of Rwanda and are under the authority of Archbishop Emmanuel Kollini, the Primate of Rwanda, the Anglican Mission is for a large part unaffected by the few oversight and accountability mechanisms in the ACNA constitution and canons. It exists as a separate para-church organization within the para-church organization of the ACNA. It is a part of the ACNA but is at the same time independent of the ACNA. It is not subordinate to the ACNA but functions more like a senior partner with the ACNA, a relationship that the ACNA judicatories that were not members of the Common Cause Partnership but have affiliated with the ACNA under the provisions of its provisional constitution and canons or its present constitution and canons do not enjoy.

The peculiar relationship of the Anglican Mission with the Anglican Church in North America raises a number of questions regarding the ecclesiastical organization of the ACNA and its status as “a province in formation.” At its present stage the ACNA is essentially a federation of Anglican para-church organizations, with each member organization having its own structure and form of governance and enjoying varying degrees of autonomy. The fourth article in this series will examine the structure and form of governance of the ACNA at its federal level particularly in terms of oversight and accountability. The article will identify a number of problem areas and consider the possible effects of these problem areas upon the future direction of the ACNA