Read Part 1
By Robin G. Jordan
When I say that the role of the bishops in the Anglican Church in North America should be largely advisory, I am not suggesting that they would not have a role in the governance of the province. Rather that the role they would play should be a limited one. Individual bishops would have a seat, a voice, and a vote in the Provincial Assembly but they would not vote separately from the rest of the Provincial Assembly. They would vote with the other clergy and lay delegates. The bishops would be able to make statements collectively as a conference of bishops but such statements would be advisory. If one or more bishops did not agree with a statement of the conference of bishops, the dissenting opinions would be published with the statement much in the same way that members of a committee or other group who disagree with the majority may present a separate report. Where the members of the conference of bishops were not genuinely in full agreement on a matter, there would be no pretense of unanimity to conceal the divisions in that body. Complete transparency would be required from the conference of bishops.
The Provincial Council would include episcopal representation. At a minimum the lead bishop of each “super-diocese” would be an ex officio member of the Provincial Council.
The designation of the bishops collectively as the College of Bishops would be dropped. While the term is used in the governance documents of the Scottish Episcopal Church and a number of the other Anglican provinces, its use in the Anglican Church in North America is pretentious. It evokes the image of the Roman Catholic Church’s College of Cardinals. The solemn convocation of the ACNA bishops to elect Archbishop Foley Beach reinforced that image. Possible alternatives are Bishops Advisory Council, Conference of Bishops, Council of Bishops, or Synod of Bishops, all of which are used in a number of denominations, including the Anglican Church.
Individual bishops would be nominated and elected by the area or network over which they have spiritual oversight. Certification of the election would be sent by the appropriate officer to the lead bishop of the “super-diocese” who would notify the other bishops of the diocese. Should one or more of these bishops object to the election of the person elected a bishop, a written objection would be submitted to the lead bishop. However, objection would be only taken on the grounds that the person elected did not meet the eligibility requirements prescribed in the canons of the “super-diocese.” If an objection is received within the time limit for submitting objects, the lead bishop would call a meeting of the other bishops of the diocese to consider the objection. The bishop-elect would also be notified of the meeting so that he or his representative could attend the meeting and answer the objection. The bishops of the “super-diocese” would at the meeting determine if the objection had any substance to it. The bishop-elect would have the right to appeal their decision to the Constitutional Court which would rule on whether the bishops had sufficient grounds for sustaining the objection. The decision of the Constitutional Court would be final. If no objection to the confirmation of the election of the bishop-elect is sent to the lead bishop of the “super-diocese” within the prescribed time limit, if the bishops of the diocese decide that the objection has no substance, or if the Constitutional Court, upon appeal of the diocese’s bishops’ decision to that body, rules in favor of the bishop-elect, the lead bishop of the “super-diocese” and two other bishops of the diocese would confirm the election in writing.
Rather than having a standing committee like the judicatories of the Episcopal Church, each area or network would have an administrator who performs the duties and responsibilities of the area or network bishop in the event the office falls vacant due to the death, serious illness, or prolonged absence of the area or network bishop until a new bishop is elected. This is a common practice in the judicatories of the Anglican Church of Australia.
In the event after repeated attempts an area or network is unable to elect a bishop, the appropriate officer of the area or network would notify the lead bishop of the “super-diocese” that a bishop is required to be elected for the area or network. The lead bishop would form a search committee made up of representatives from a panel of bishops, clergy, and lay persons established for that purpose and clerical and lay representatives from the area or network requiring a bishop. The duties of this search committee would be the same as those of the area or network search committee. The search committee would prepare dossiers on suitable candidates and submit them to the lead bishop of the “super-diocese” within a specified time limit. After he has received these dossiers, he would convene a meeting of the bishops of the diocese for the purpose of nominating and electing a bishop for the area or network. At that meeting he would present the dossiers to the other bishops. The bishops would be able to nominate on the first ballot persons other than those recommended by the search committee.
This system is a variation of one used in the Anglican Church of the Province of South America and a number of the ecclesiastical provinces of the Anglican Church of Australia (ACA). In the ACA a diocese may also delegate the nomination and election of a new bishop to the province on a one time basis and may revoke that delegation at any time in the process. The new bishop must also be approved by the diocesan synod. A system for nominating and electing bishops also used in the ACA is the board of electors. This board is elected by the diocesan synod and consists of electors who are not members of the synod and those who are synod members. It nominates and elects the new bishop who must then be approved by the diocesan synod.
Except in a few African provinces nomination and election of a new bishop by the province’s bishops is not a common practice except when circumstances prevent a diocese from nominating and electing its own bishop. The African provinces in questions appear to have been influenced by the Roman Catholic Church.
The first of the two existing methods of electing bishops in the Anglican Church in North America goes back to the early days of the Christian Church when the clergy and laity of a diocese elected their own bishop. The second of these methods, the one which the canons tout as the preferred method, on the other hand, was adapted from the revised canons of the Anglican Church of Rwanda which were drafted by an AMiA priest who is a former Roman Catholic and studied the Roman Catholic canon law. The priest in question has strong Anglo-Catholic convictions. He served on the Common Cause Governance Task Force that drafted the ACNA’s constitution and canons and his influence is discernible in these governance documents. The particular method of electing bishops is modeled upon that of the papal system of episcopal appointment with the College of Bishops taking the place of the Pope.
The lead bishop of a “super-diocese” would be elected from the bishops of the diocese by the synod of the diocese. He would normally be the bishop of an area or network of the diocese. He would hold office for a specific term. The “super-dioceses” in their governance documents would be free to set term limits on their bishops and to require periodic reviews of their ministry after which the synod of the diocese would decide whether to extend their term of office. The diocese would also be free to remove bishops for cause.
As for the archbishop of the Anglican Church in North America, he is neither fish nor fowl. In the original constitution and canons of the ACNA he was little more than a presiding bishop with a fancy title and a few appointive powers. The ACNA’s governance documents do not vest metropolitical authority in the office of archbishop or recognize it as inherent in that office. Yet they require the other bishops of the province to swear an oath of obedience to the archbishop as if the occupant of that office is a metropolitan.
In the Anglican Church of Australia and a number of other Anglican provinces metropolitical authority is vested in the metropolitan who is the chief bishop of each ecclesiastical province. The ACA has several metropolitans since it has several ecclesial provinces. The primate of the ACA has metropolitical authority because he is a metropolitan of one of those provinces. Despite his title he is essential a presiding bishop with some additional duties and responsibilities prescribed by the ACA’s constitution and canons. In the Anglican Church of the Province of South America metropolitical authority is defined in the canons and vested in the Provincial Executive Council which is elected by the Provincial Synod and is under the presidency of the Presiding Bishop. The Presiding Bishop is named by the Provincial Synod from the episcopal members of the Provincial Executive Council. Both approaches have merit.
If the Anglican Church in North America is reorganized into “super-dioceses,” it would make sense to vest metropolitical authority into the lead bishop of the “super-diocese” or in an executive council of the “super-diocese” with the bishop president of that council serving as lead bishop of the “super-diocese.” The choice might be left to each “super-diocese.” The largely ceremonial office of primate could be rotated among the “super-dioceses.” Alternately the Provincial Assembly could name one of the lead bishops on the Provincial Council to serve as the president of the council and the primate of the province. In any event the requirement that all bishops of the province must take an oath of obedience to the primate should be dropped. It would not make sense if metropolitical authority is vested in the lead bishop of a “super-diocese” or its executive council. No bishop should be required to take an oath of obedience to a primate with whom he may have no theological affinity.
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